Can a prompt injection make our AI agent leak data?
Yes. On 18 August 2026 NVD published CVE‑2026‑75130: poisoned custom instructions served through the Context7 MCP server could make a connected AI coding agent send credentials from environment files to an attacker during a routine documentation lookup. VulnCheck rated it CVSS 9.0.
I treat every email, document and web page as untrusted input: kept apart from instructions and read by narrow tools that get no wider access than the user they act for. I built it that way as principal engineer of Patriot Mail, an AI email client where every incoming message is written by a stranger. In May 2026 I red‑teamed a product’s AI assistant with prompt-injection patterns, got a fresh session to reveal its context, and set the rule that its system prompt counts as public, so nothing secret goes in it.
